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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the private capital market in Verona in the se-
cond half of the seventeenth century, drawing upon notaries’ loan
contracts. In a period in which formal credit institutions such as joint
stock banks still did not exist the role of notaries proved crucial in
non-istitutionalized credit networks. While a share of the contracts
were distributed among citizens belonging to the same social class,
most of the loans were drawn up between individuals coming from
heterogeneous groups. The capital, which was mainly provided by
the urban elite, including nobles, patricians and a dynamic and
emerging bourgeoisie, aimed to finance a vast range of needs, from
everyday expenses, to extraordinary ones, from the purchase of a
plot of land, or a house, to the provision of a dowry. Yet, part of
these financial resources aimed to support activities which gave new
impetus to the Veronese economy that in the seventeenth century
was gradually recovering from a period of stagnation. In effect, some
capital was invested in agrarian activities, such as, for instance, the
creation of new and profitable paddy fields, as well as in urban ac-
tivities, like the starting up of new businesses and shops. All in all,
the notaries, widely spread in the city and the countryside, helped
the Veronese credit market function efficiently because of their role
as depositories of publica fides and of financial intermediaries, pa-
ving the way to a future economic modernization.
Recent studies have highlighted the crucial role that notaries
played in pre-industrial societies as financial intermediaries within
the local credit market1. A large proportion of citizens and rural in-
1 The function of notaries in traditional credit market has been investigated in detail
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habitants turned to them to sign a will, a sale, a dowry or a loan.
Furthermore, they learned whether a client had just sold a plot of
land, for instance, and had liquidity to invest or, conversely, if a
client was looking for cash. Notaries generally drew up contracts in
their own office, which was often also their house. However, it was
not unusual for a notary to personally visit a client’s home, say, to
register a dowry. Therefore, he sometimes got to be on confidential
terms with his clients2. Most aristocratic families and well-off citi-
zens had their own notaio di fiducia (trusted notary), who registered
all the transactions related to the family’s assets and kept permanent
records of them in his archives. This privileged position enabled no-
taries to know their clients, not only in economic and financial terms
but also in terms of reputation. They learned whether their clients,
were reliable, trustworthy, and honest. All this information was es-
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by P.T. Hoffman, G. Postel-Vinay, J-L. Rosenthal, “What Do Notaries Do? Overcoming
Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751”, in Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154, 1998, 3, pp. 499-530; see also of the same au-
thors, Priceless Markets. The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-1870, The University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000. Almost thirty years ago Gigi Corazzol, studying credit
market in sixteenth-century Venice, maintained similarly that notaries operated as “te-
chnicians and intermediaries” and also as “intermediari tanto conosciuti da funzionare
all’incirca come delle istituzioni” (“so well-known intermediaries, that functioned as
institutions”), G. Corazzol, I livelli stipulati a Venezia nel 1591, Giardini Editori, Pisa,
1986, p. 17. On early-modern capital market in Europe see, E.M. García Guerra, G. De
Luca (eds.), Il mercato del credito in età moderna. Reti e operatori finanziari nello spazio euro-
peo, Franco Angeli, Milan, 2010. On late medieval Holland see J. Van Zanden, J. Zuij-
derduijn and T. De Moor, “Small is beautiful: the efficiency of credit markets in the late
medieval Holland”, in European Review of Economic History, 16, 2012, pp. 3-22. Notaries
had an essential role in informal credit markets even in presence of banks, see J. Levy,
“Notaries and credit markets in nineteenth-century Mexico”, in Business History Review,
84, 2010, pp. 459-478; G. De Luca, “Informal Credit and Economic Modernization in
Milan (1802-1840)”, in The Journal of European Economic History, XLII, 2013, pp. 211-234.
2 See for instance the case studied by M. Berengo, “Africo Clementi, agronomo pado-
vano del Cinquecento”, in Miscellanea augusto campana - Medioevo e Umanesimo, 44, 1981.
Analyzing notaries in Southern Switzerland, Ostinelli Lumia defined them “notai iti-
neranti”, G. Ostinelli-Lumia, “Notarii pubblici ‘Comi et Mendrisii’: istituzioni, attività
e clientela tra baliaggio di Mendrisio e territorio comasco (XV-XVIII secolo)”, in L. Lo-
renzetti, N. Valsangiacomo (eds.), Lo spazio insubrico. Un’identità storica tra i percorsi po-
litici e realtà socio-economiche 1500-1900, Giampiero Casagrande Editore, Bellinzona, 1997.
04-lorenzini_121_148_04-lorenzini_121_148  12/11/15  12:03  Pagina 124
sential to the good functioning of the credit market3. By preparing
and properly channeling such information, the notary was able to
match demand for money with supply (debtor with creditor), thus
operating on the capital market as a non-institutionalized financial
intermediary4. By easing the flow of information, the notary helped
to reduce information asymmetries and lower transaction costs, the-
reby enabling the credit market to develop and expand5.
Against this backdrop, this essay analyses the credit market in
Verona during the second half of the seventeenth century by dra-
wing upon notaries’ contracts. The goal is to gain a better under-
standing of the dynamics of the Veronese credit networks together
with the role of notaries as “brokers” within it. Notaries’ documents,
which constitute the primary source, have been cross-referenced
with data from fiscal registers, the so-called polizze d’estimo which
every citizen and institution (religious bodies as well as lay organi-
zations) were obliged to compile for the Venetian authority. Every
polizza contained a description of the head of household (sometimes
his profession) and real estate, including capital, or livelli. These
could be of two kinds: livelli passivi, (revenues from borrowed
money), or livelli attivi (revenues from lent money)6. These fiscal re-
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3 On the relevance of values like trust and reputation in informal credit market see C.
Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation. The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early
Modern England, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1998; L. Fontaine, L’économie morale: pau-
vreté, crédit et confiance dans l’Europe préindustrielle, Gallimard, Paris, 2008 and of the
same author, Antonio and Shylock: Credit and Trust in France, c. 1680 – c. 1780”, in The
Economic History Review, 54, 2001, pp. 39-57. On informal credit networks in ancien ré-
gime socities, see M. Carboni, M.G. Muzzarelli, Reti di credito. Circuiti informali, impropri,
nascosti (secoli XIII-XIX), Il Mulino, Bologna 2014; M. Carbonell, Sobreviure a Barcelona.
Dones, pobresa i assistència al segle XVIII, Vic, Eumo, 1997.
4 His work consisted officially in registering contracts, and unlike moneychangers or
official brokers (sensali) for instance, he was not paid for the intermediation service, see
G. De Luca, “Tra reti e istituzioni. Per una lettura del sistema creditizio milanese nei
primi decenni dell’Ottocento”, in Storia in Lombardia, 28, 2007, pp. 5-33.
5 See D. C. North, “Transaction Costs in History”, in The Journal of European Economic
History, 3, 1985, pp. 557-576.
6 Polizze have some limitations. They were fiscal documents, upon which the Venetian
government established taxes, hence a taxpayer was induced to register less than what
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cords show that almost every citizen had “active” or “passive” livelli.
Credit was, indeed, ubiquitous, being widely spread in almost all
levels of population.
In particular, our analysis concentrates on four benchmark years:
1676, 1681, 1686, and 1691. During this time Verona was not affected
by severe events such as wars or famines. In fact, the aim of this
study is to investigate the Veronese credit market in “normal” cir-
cumstances. During that period Verona was still recovering from the
plague that had hit it in the 1630s, along with many other European
cities. Its population fell from about 50,000 in 1630 to roughly 23,000
one year later, and it failed to return to its pre-plague level for the
ensuing century. Manufacturing and trade underwent a profound
restructuring and agriculture became the major sector of inve-
stment7.
The Veronese credit system, as in other early-modern societies,
was based on formal and informal structures. The formal structure
consisted of the institutions that issued credit, for instance the Monte
di Pietà (pawnshop). In Italy, these were created at the end of the fif-
teenth century in order to furnish credit to the lower social classes
(peasants, small merchants, artisans). The pawnshop provided small
and short-term loans (6 months to 1 year) at an interest rate that ran-
ged from 5% to 6%8. At the beginning of the seventeenth century,
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he really owned. In addition such registers were not regularly updated, but only in
times of war or when the state’s coffers were depleted. Despite these limitations, polizze
d’estimo are key documents for studying the social and economic system of the Republic
of Venice and its dominions. For the criteria upon which taxes were calculated see G.
Borelli, “Introduzione alle relazioni dei Podestà e Capitani di Verona”, Relazioni dei Ret-
tori veneti in terraferma. Podestaria e Capitanato di Verona, edited by A. Tagliaferri, vol. IX,
Giuffré, Milan, 1977, pp. XV-LXXXVIII; V. Chilese, Una città nel Seicento veneto. Verona
attraverso le fonti fiscali del 1653, Accademia di Agricoltura, Scienze e Lettere, Verona,
2002. Verona fell under the dominion of the Venetian Republic in 1405 until 1796, when
the French troops led by Napoleon invaded the city and imposed his authority.
7 See P. Lanaro (ed.), At the Centre of the Old World. Trade and Manufacturing in Venice and
the Venetian Mainland, 1400-1800, Victoria University, Toronto 2006; A. Zannini, “L’eco-
nomia veneta nel Seicento. Oltre il paradigma della ‘crisi generale’”, in La popolazione
italiana nel Seicento, Clueb, Bologna, 1999.
8 The great change occurred in the mid-16th century when the Veronese pawnshop bu-
siness was divided into two branches: Monte Piccolo supplied free loans for the poorest
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the Veronese pawnshop managed around 500,000 ducats (3,100,000
Venetian lire, henceforth v.l.)9.
The informal structure consisted of complementary credit net-
works, which included the religious bodies, especially the Regular
Orders. As a kind of heterogeneity of ends beside the spiritual goals,
they practised a lively credit activity, becoming some of the most im-
portant money-suppliers of the Republic of Venice and its domi-
nions. The thirty monasteries and convents in Verona in the second
half of the seventeenth century had invested 1,327,000 ducats
(8,227,400 v.l.) in loans, two-thirds of which belonged to female con-
vents10; an amount that was more than double the pawnshops’ ca-
pital. This situation was the result of a long process of wealth
accumulation, which for some Orders had begun in the early Middle
Ages11. Their lending activity increased greatly after the laws issued
by the Serenissima. The Venetian government always feared the eco-
nomic power of the Church, which was rising because of the conti-
nuous flows of donations by believers, consisting of plots of land,
houses, shops and real estate in the countryside. In order to stop this
phenomenon the government passed two measures, Parte of 1602
and 1605, according to which the ecclesiastical bodies had to sell, wi-
THE CREDIT MARKET AND NOTARIES IN VERONA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
127JEEH • 1/2015
people; Monte Grande accepted deposits and issued loans at 5-6%, see C. Ferlito, Il
Monte di Pietà di Verona e il contesto economico-sociale della città nel secondo settecento, Isti-
tuto Veneto di Lettere, Scienze ed Arti, Venezia 2009, p. 40. On the activity of the vero-
nese pawnshop see also P. Lanaro, “L’attività di prestito dei Monti di Pietà in Terraferma
veneta: legalità e illeciti tra Quattrocento e primo Seicento”, in Studi storici Luigi Simeoni,
XXXIII, 1983, pp. 161-177. On the origins of the Italian pawnshops, see among others
M.G. Muzzarelli, Il denaro e la salvezza. L’invenzione del Monte di Pietà, Il Mulino, Bologna,
2001.
9 See “Relazione Girolamo Corner”, in Relazioni dei Rettori veneti in Terraferma, p. 193. 1
ducat equalled 6 lire and 4 soldi.
10 See G. Zalin, “L’invasione militare francese e i primi sfaldamenti della proprietà ec-
clesiastica in terra veneta (1797-1798)”, in Veneto e Lombardia tra rivoluzione giacobina ed
età napoleonica. Economia, territorio, istituzioni, edited by G.L. Fontana, A. Lazzarini, La-
terza, Rome-Bari, 1992, pp. 49.
11 See F. Landi, “I grandi patrimoni del clero regolare maschile: le peculiarità di un si-
stema contabile e gestionale”, in Tra rendita e investimenti. Formazione e gestione dei grandi
patrimoni in Italia in età moderna e contemporanea, Società italiana degli storici dell’eco-
nomia, Bari, 1998, pp. 578-579.
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thin two years, the real estate that they had received ob piam causam
(for pious causes). Hence the Church and especially the Regular Or-
ders had large amounts of available cash which was rapidly inve-
sted in lending activity12. Their credit network was very extensive
and included peasants, artisans, merchants and especially members
of the urban aristocracy. Borrowing from friars and nuns had seve-
ral advantages. The first was that the debt could be extinguished
quandocumque, meaning that there were no time limits; the ecclesia-
stics’ economic goal, in effect, was to assure themselves long-term
and secure revenues. The second was that lower interest rates were
generally charged for large sums (4% for loans of thousands of du-
cats).
Informal credit networks embraced the capital market centred
on notaries. In contrast to the institutions mentioned above, notaries
were neither money-collectors nor money-suppliers. Notaries drew
up a wide range of contracts. The large amount of information they
quite regularly collected on their clients made them key figures in-
side such a market, and in particular in the private credit market.
In the four benchmark years, the Veronese notaries produced a total
of 11,170 contracts, 942 (8%) of which concerned loans13. The num-
ber of notaries was fixed by the city authority, and in the years exa-
mined their number ranged from 62 to 6814. If we consider that
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12 The position of the Church on usury had gradually softened. Literature on this issue
is vast, see here P. Vismara, Oltre l’usura. La Chiesa moderna e il prestito ad interesse, Rub-
bettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2004; J.H.Munro, “The Medieval Origins of the Financial Re-
volution: Usury, Rentes, and Negotiability”, in The International History Review, XXV,
2003, pp. 505-562; Credito e usura fra teologia, diritto e amministrazione. Linguaggi a con-
fronto (sec. XII-XVI), edited by D. Quaglioni, G. Todeschini, G.M. Varanini, École Fran-
çaise de Rome, Rome, 2005; G. Todeschini, Ricchezza francescana. Dalla povertà volontaria
alla società di mercato, Il Mulino, Bologna 2004.
13 In baroque Rome the credit transactions registered by notaries constituted around
12%, see R. Ago, Economia barocca. Mercato e istituzioni nella Roma del Seicento, Donzelli,
Rome, 1998, pp. 6, 191. In eighteenth-century Trento the percentage amounted to 7.2%
and 15% in nearby Rovereto. These two figures come from a research I am currently
conducting on Trento and Rovereto in the second half of the 18th century based on no-
taries’ contracts deposited in Archivio di Stato, Trento, Fondo notarile.
14 Notaries in Verona were divided into four “cronica”, i.e. groups based on the activity
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Verona had around 32,000 inhabitants at that time, this means that
there was one notary for every 500 residents. This is a high propor-
tion if compared, not only with the situation today, but also with
other cities of that time. In Venice for instance, at the beginning of
the sixteenth century there were 66 notaries, namely one notary per
2,200 inhabitants15.
But not all notaries drew up credit contracts. More specifically,
those that did so amounted to 16 in 1676, yet their number progres-
sively increased in the following years, reaching 20 in 1681, 22 in
1686 and 28 in 1691. On average, each notary drew up from 11 to 15
loan contracts (see Table 1). The number of acts registered by one
notary or another could vary significantly. There were notaries who
registered just one or two acts in one year, for example Antonio Sut-
tori, or Giovanni Zeni16, and conversely notaries who drew up se-
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that they undertook: 1) cronica maior included notaries who were entitled to operate in
public offices; 2) cronica media referred to notaries who privately exercised their profes-
sion in the city and in the countryside; 3) cronica minor included those who were allowed
to operate only in the countryside; 4) cronica extraordinaria, which comprised foreign
notaries.
15 See G. Corazzol, “Varietà notarile: scorci di vita economica e sociale”, in Storia di Ve-
nezia. Dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima, VI, Dal Rinascimento al Barocco, edited by
G. Cozzi, P. Prodi, Treccani, Rome, 1994, pp. 775-776.
16 Some notaries who were enrolled with the Collegio Notarile exercised in parallel
other professions or benefitted from estate revenues, see V. Chilese, Una città nel Seicento
veneto, pp. 104-114.
TABLE 1
Notaries, loans, percentage of loans (figures in Venetian lire)
Year N. ofnotaries
N. of active
notaries1
Total
acts Loans
% of
loans
Venetian
lire
1676 62 16 3.193 241 7,6 358,373
1681 67 20 3.049 269 8,8 497,008
1686 68 22 2.582 248 8,6 459,404
1691 62 28 2.346 184 8,4 207,710
Tot. 11.170 942 8,4
1 Notaries who drew up debt/credit contracts in the examined benchmark years.
Source: elaboration on the notaries’ contracts listed in the Archive References.
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veral dozen. For instance, in 1676 Vincenzo Ferro drew up 69 credit
contracts (equal to 28% of total acts), Francesco Bernardi 56 (23%),
Antonio Trezio 33 (13.5%) and Francesco Vidali 29 (12%)17. These
four notaries had almost the monopoly on loans, managing 88%
(around 300,000 v.l.) of the capital transacted. This centralized mar-
ket gradually became more fragmented: on the one hand, the num-
ber of notaries increased; on the other, the percentage of loans
registered by the notaries became more evenly distributed.
The most wide-spread (90%) financial instrument registered by
notaries in the Venetian mainland was the emptio cum locatione, a
long-term credit contract18. It literally means “sale with lease” and
was a sort of loan “in disguise”. The contract was divided into three
parts: in the first (emptio) the seller (actually the debtor) sold a plot
of land, or a house to a buyer (actually the creditor) from whom he
received a sum of money. In the second part of the contract (locatio)
the seller received the assets back and in turn paid a rent to the new
landowner (the buyer/creditor) which was tantamount to the inte-
rest rate applied to the sum of money that had just been received.
The final part of the act stated the affrancabilità (redeemability), i.e.
the possibility for the debtor regaining the plot of land or house if
s/he returned the money. In case the seller was unable to pay off
his/her debt by the deadline, either the act could be renewed or the
creditor became the definitive owner of the item of real estate. Along
with emptio cum locatione, other financial instruments, if rare, drawn
up by notaries were the creditum – a medium/short-term credit,
often interest-free and collateral-free – and lettera di cambio (bill of
exchange), short-term and interest-free credit.
The need to disguise a loan with a contract of “fictitious sale”
reached back to the Middle Ages, when the Church banned any in-
terest rate on loans. Very likely it was the notaries who devised the
contract of emptio cum locatione, as a loophole through which to by-
pass the usury laws. The act, which was originally divided into two
MARCELLA LORENZINI
130 THE JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
17 These notaries belonged to families who had been notaries for generations.
18 Credit contracts were sometimes disguised as acts of either emptio or locatio.
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separate contracts – emptio and locatio – one following the other, con-
cealed the sinful deal19. Thereafter, the Church changed its attitude
and gradually allowed low interest rates. The livelli, also called censi
in the Italian peninsula, spread widely, especially after the bull is-
sued by Pious V in 156920. This reform allowed interest rates, provi-
ded that they did not exceed 7%. Moreover, loans had to be based
on collateral (real estate, tolls, tithes) and had to be redeemable. In
the second half of the seventeenth century, interest rates were no lon-
ger camouflaged. The formula “in ragion di [quattro, cinque, sei…]
per cento” (at [four, five, six…] per cent) was clearly expressed in
the contract. Such credit instruments became negotiable and helped
the market to become more liquid and flexible. They represented
useful credit tools for those who had no ready cash, and at the same
time were good investments for “capitalists”. They were more fruit-
ful than the revenues offered by a plot of land and equally secure,
since such loans were always covered by collateral21.
The credit activity intermediated by notaries changed quite mar-
kedly in the considered time-span (see Table 1). In 1676 the total
amount of capital transferred was equal to 358,000 v.l. The sum mar-
kedly increased in 1681 to 497,000 v.l., remained high in 1686 with
459,000 v.l., and decreased in 1691 to 207,000 v.l.22. In the two central
benchmark years, the credit market was influenced by a strong de-
mand from the city and of the communes in the countryside.
However, the largest number of debts were incurred by citizens
from the lower classes, as the loan size suggests. Loans of up to 50
ducats (310 v.l.) steadily increased, rising from almost 25% in 1676
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19 See S. Collodo, Una società in trasformazione. Padova tra XI e XV secolo, Ed. Antenore,
Padua, 1990, p. 196.
20 See L. Alonzi, “I censi consegnativi nel XVI e nel XVII secolo tra ‘finzione’ e ‘realtà’”,
in L’Acropoli, 1, 2005, n. 6, pp. 86-102.
21 The revenue of a plot of cultivated land was on average 4%, see G. Borelli, Un patri-
ziato della Terraferma veneta, Giuffré, Milan, 1974, p. 361.
22 The total capital flow of 1676 was similar to the income produced by the “dazio della
stadella”, i.e. the duty levied on imported goods in 1636, equal to 51,922 ducats (321,916
v.l.). See Relazioni dei rettori veneti in Terraferma, p. 351.
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The most common collateral was land (mainly farmland)24
to 33% in 169123. Instead, sums of between 50 and 100 ducats (from
310 to 620 v.l.) dropped from 30% (1676) to 23% (1691). So did loans
of between 100 and 200 ducats, which decreased from 22% (1676) to
19% (1691). Conversely, sums from 300 to 600 ducats generally in-
creased (see Table 2).
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23 To give an idea of purchasing power, with 50 ducats (310 v.l.) it was possible to buy
about 3,000 square metres of farmland. An unskilled worker earned approximately 1
v.l. per day and 250 v.l. per year. An average family with four members spent roughly
248 v.l. in one year, see: L. Pezzolo, Il fisco dei veneziani. Finanza pubblica ed economia pri-
vata tra XV e XVII secolo, Cierre Edizioni, Verona, 2003, p. 158.
24 Contracts often defined the exact quantity of campi (1 campo was equal to 3,047 sqm).
The plot of land employed for collateral was almost always cultivated, with vineyards
and mulberry trees.
TABLE 2
Loan sizes in ducats
Years
Ducats 1676 1681 1686 1691
0-50 25.8 27.7 32 33.2
51-100 30.3 27 23.4 23.7
101-200 22.5 20.5 15.3 19.5
201-300 5 8.6 8.1 8.9
301-400 3.3 4.3 5.2 5.3
401-500 3.3 2.9 3.6 3.7
501-600 2 0.7 3.6 3.2
601-700 0.4 0 0 0.5
701-800 1.2 1.4 2 0
801-900 2.4 2.6 1.6 0
901-1.000 1.2 1.4 2 0
1.001-2.000 2.4 2.6 1.6 2
2.001-3.000 1 0.4 1.2 0
3.001-4.000 0 0.4 0.8 0
> 4.000 0.4 1 0.8 0
Source: elaboration on the notaries’ acts listed in the Archival References.
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which constituted 80% of all collateral, followed by houses, shops,
mills and sometimes tolls or tithes. For 50-ducat loans the collateral
could range from half a campo (1,500 sq m)25 to 30 campi (90,000 sq
m)26, paying the same 6% interest rate. Similarly, for 100-ducat loans
at 6%, the debtor could be required to commit from 327 to 2428 campi
(see Figure 1). The wide differences were probably due to the risk
level: since the price of money (i.e. the interest rate) could not be in-
creased (the limit imposed by the Veronese municipality was 6%)29,
for more risky operations a greater collateral was required. The cor-
relation between loan size and collateral is bigger with higher sums
(see Figure 2).
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25 Archivio di Stato, Verona (henceforth Asvr), Fondo notarile (notary Antonio Trezio),
busta (folder) 10900, prot. 60, 25 November 1676.
26 Asvr, Fondo notarile (notary Francesco Bernardi), busta 1428, prot. 730, 24 November
1676.
27 Asvr, Fondo notarile (notary Nascimbene Bajetta), busta 1532, prot. 1, 16 May 1676.
28 Asvr, Fondo notarile (notary Vincenzo Ferro) busta 5246, prot. 393, 7 May 1676.
29 Originally the rent was paid in goods. In the second half of the 16th century the steep
rise in prices impoverished the lower social classes, which rose up against the authori-
ties. They demanded that interest rates be paid in money and no longer in goods. The
Venetian Senate then issued a law ordering that interest rates on loans drawn up since
1520 had to be paid in cash, and that these rates could not exceed 6%. The city of Verona
enacted the reform on 9 May 1553.
FIGURE 1
Distribution of collateral and loans (0-100 ducats)
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Members of diverse social strata went to notaries to take out
loans. In order to analyse the cash flows, contractors have been di-
vided into groups according to their social position or profession:
the nobles and patricians, workers and professionals30, religious in-
stitutions31 and the Jewish community32. A separate category has
been created for the communes of the countryside and the city of
Verona. Some of these economic actors attended the capital market
as only creditors (the religious institutions) or as only debtors (the
city, the municipalities and the Jewish community).
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30 Artisans, merchants, notaries, lawyers, doctors, spice sellers (“speziali”), and also far-
mers.
31 Monasteries, convents, parishes, and religious institutions.
32 Jews had been forbidden to engage in credit activity since the second half of the 16th
century. Most of them devoted themselves to commerce. However, Jews as creditors
were still present in the 17th century. They secretly issued loans with high interest rates
(up to 30%): see G. Borelli, “Momenti della presenza ebraica a Verona tra Cinque e Set-
tecento”, in Gli Ebrei e Venezia: secoli XIV-XVIII, edited by G. Cozzi, Edizioni di Comu-
nità, Milan, 1987, p. 283. In this study, the Jews are present in the credit market in the
form of the Community (“Università”) and only as debtors. Lenders of the Jewish com-
munity were quite exclusively representatives of the patriciate.
FIGURE 2
Distribution of collateral and all loans
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The bulk of the capital came from the nobles and patricians. The
shares that they supplied were respectively 40% (1676), 44% (1681),
42% (1686), 36% (1691). The second largest group of lenders consi-
sted of artisans, lawyers, doctors, and an emerging group of mer-
chant families that, thanks to the wealth accumulation through
trade, reached political power and, some of them, noble titles in the
following century33. Their sums amounted to respectively 32%
(1676), increased in the following years to 33% (1681), 46% (1686)34
and 41% (1691). The other significant money suppliers were the re-
ligious institutions, as mentioned above. They injected into the ca-
pital market 28% (1676), 23% (1681), 11% (1686) and 23% (1691) of
all capital flow. Monasteries and convents lent money to individuals
from different social classes, but the largest sums were provided to
members of the aristocracy35. Credit was, indeed, conceived not only
a financial instrument but also as a means to establish or reinforce
social, political and economic ties (see Table 3).
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33 Some of these families, as for instance the Piatti, acquired in the eighteenth century
the long-desired title of earl.
34 The particular high percentage is due to one exceptionally big operation (more than
9,000 ducats) among merchants.
35 Almost half of the total credits issued for instance by the Dominicans of St. Anastasia
in Verona was addressed to the city patriciate, see M. Lorenzini, “‘Di solenne e privile-
giatissimo credito’. Tecniche e strategie di investimento finanziario del convento di
Santa Anastasia di Verona (secoli XVII- XVIII)”, in Studi storici Luigi Simeoni, LIX, 2009,
p. 70.
TABLE 3
Quota of loans per group of lenders
Lenders
Years
1676 1681 1686 1691
Patricians 40% 44% 42% 36%
Religious institutions 28% 23% 11% 23%
Merchants, artisans, peasants 32% 33% 46% 41%
Source: elaboration on the notaries’ acts listed in the Archival References.
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The interest rate on loans could range from a minimum of 4% to
6%. The majority of loans were issued at 6% (see Table 5). Loans at
6% gradually decreased in the second half of the seventeenth cen-
On the demand side, the predominant source of capital was bor-
rowed by the group including artisans, merchants, peasants and pro-
fessionals, while the second largest cluster is constituted by the elite.
The new element in the demand party is the presence of rural mu-
nicipalities and the Jewish community, which participate in the mar-
ket only as debtors. The Jews monopolized the credit market in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries36. However, since the sixteenth
century they had been repeatedly persecuted by the Venetian Repu-
blic. They were eventually banned from engaging in any lending ac-
tivity and confined in the ghetto. During the seventeenth century,
the Jews switched to trade yet they continued to lend money secretly
at high interest rates37 (see Table 4).
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36 See G.M. Varanini, “Appunti per la storia del prestito e dell’insediamento ebraico a
Verona nel Quattrocento. Problemi e linee di ricerca”, in Gli Ebrei e Venezia, pp. 615-626;
A. Tagliaferri, “Problemi dell’attività di credito in Terraferma tra XV e XVIII secolo”, in
Studi storici Luigi Simeoni, XXXIII, 1983, p. 53.
37 See G. Zalin, “Il passaggio dall’attività di prestito alla attività di intermediazione
degli ebrei veneti nel Cinque e Seicento”, in Studi storici Luigi Simeoni, XXXIII, 1983, pp.
263-270; B. Pullan, La politica sociale della Repubblica di Venezia. 1500-1620, vol. II, Gli Ebrei
veneziani e i Monti di Pietà, Il Veltro, Rome 1982, pp. 482-498.
TABLE 4
Quota of loans per group of borrowers
Borrowers
Years
1676 1681 1686 1691
Patricians 34% 41% 37% 30%
Religious institutions 4% 3% 2% 16%
Merchants, artisans, peasants, professionals 55% 32% 51% 54%
Communities 7% 20% 2% 0%
Jewish Community 0% 4% 8% 0%
Source: elaboration on the notaries’ acts listed in the Archival References.
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tury, while loans at 5.5% and 5% rose (see Figure 3). The lower figure
was the interest rate, the higher was the sum of money borrowed;
for thousands of ducats the interest rate was around 4%. Borrowers
of high sums were generally members of the urban elite, hence low-
risk operators, who in turn mortgaged substantial plots of land, hou-
ses and villas.
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TABLE 5
Distribution of loans per interest rate
Interest rate
Year
1676 1681 1686 1691
6 86% 78% 81% 67%
5.5 3% 10% 11% 14%
5 4.5% 2.8% 4% 6.8%
4 1.6% 1.7% 0.4% 1.5%
Other1 4.9% 7.5% 3.6% 10.7%
1 Interest rates below 4% or over 6% (i.e. rents on products).
FIGURE 3
Number of loans per interest rate (1676-1691)
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The reasons that induced a city-dweller or a peasant to borrow
money were very different. The largest quantity of money was em-
ployed to pay off old debts or to change short-term into long-term
debts (45%)38. The second major cause (24%) was taxes (gravezze) that
both citizens and public bodies (including the city and the commu-
nes of the countryside) had to pay to the Serenissima. In order to
slow down the progressive impoverishment of the rural municipa-
lities, in 1673 the Venetian Senate issued a decree ordering that the
interest rate on debts contracted by the communes with private citi-
zens had to be lowered from 6% to 4.5%. The indebtedness of the
municipalities in the examined years was a consequence of that mea-
sure. However taxes were not the only reason why villages and the
city of Verona ran into debt. Most part of the borrowed money was
used to cover the expenses to repair public works, such as roads,
bridges, waterways and also the river banks. Verona was crossed by
the Adige river, which constituted the main communication route
for local and international trade and a precious resource for agricul-
ture. When it overflowed it could cause great damage. Repairing the
banks could imply huge costs. In 1677 for the overflow that occurred
in Spinimbecco, (in the eastern side of Verona), the city had to bor-
row 16.000 ducats which were supplied by a Paduan nobleman,
Francesco Manzoni, at 4% interest rate39. Three years later the city
decided to return a portion of the debt. Part of the sum was paid
back with the capital deposited on the Monte di Pietà, another part
(almost 9,000 ducats) was supplied by a new creditor, the earl Paolo
Zazzaroni, member of the city council40.
The third major cause of indebtedness (21%) was the creation of
the dowry for a daughter who was entering a convent or getting
married. Far from being a free choice for young women, marriage
was carefully planned; it was conceived as a possible means to
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38 Namely through the emptio cum locatione.
39 Letter from the Captain of Verona, 4 July 1677 included in Asvr, Fondo notarile (notaries
Francesco Vidali and Domenico Moretti), busta 11.295, 10th February 1681.
40 Ibidem.
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ascend the social hierarchy, or to enter the restricted oligarchic fa-
milies: “Nobles did not make alliances randomly”41; a conspicuous
dowry was an investment for the daughter and her family of ori-
gin42. The countess Alessandra Rambaldi, widow of the earl Gio-
vanni Francesco Bevilacqua, for example, wanted to “trovare il
denaro per fare la dote alla figlia Bianca, promessa in sposa al mar-
chese Michele Sagramoso” (“to find money in order to create the
dowry for her daughter, promised bride of the marquis Michele Sa-
gramoso”). She obtained the money, 3,000 ducats, from the female
convent of Sant’Antonio dal Corso. The loan lasted four years, du-
ring which she had to pay 5% interest rate. For that sum the noble-
woman mortgaged “un’intera possessione” (a large estate with a
country house and a farmhouse).
In the second half of the seventeenth century the city economy
was gradually recovering from the years of stagnation that had hit
Verona during the plague, with the decrease in trade and manufac-
tures. Signs of recovery appear from loans sought in order to open
shops or start up new businesses. Geronimo from Roverè, near Ve-
rona, for instance, in 1681 borrowed 200 ducats from a fellow coun-
tryman, Tommaso Canterio, in order to fulfil his son’s desire who
wanted ‘incaminarsi nell’arte di pistor’ (‘undertake the profession
of baker’). The sum served to build the house with the bakery inside,
and it very likely coincided with one-year earnings of that activity43.
In 1653 in their fiscal documents (polizze) two bakers Paolo Borghella
and Giovanni Ceschini from Isolo di Sopra declared an income of
200 ducats coming from one year of work44.
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41 See D.E. Queller, T.F. Madden, “Father of the Bride: Fathers, Daughters, and Dowries
in Late Medieval and Early Renaissance Venice”, in Renaissance Quarterly, vol. 46, n. 4,
1993, p. 703.
42 Some dowries could reach very high amounts, especially in Venice. The value of the
noblewoman Laura Tron’s dowry amounted to about 24,000 ducats and included both
cash and real estate: see P. Lanaro, “La restituzione della dote. Il gioco ambiguo della
stima tra beni mobili e beni immobili (Venezia tra Cinque e Settecento)”, in Quaderni
storici, 3, 2010, p. 769.
43 Asvr, Fondo notarile (notary Domenico Muttoni), busta 6984, 30 July 1681.
44 See, V. Chilese, Una città nel Seicento veneto, p. 190.
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Along with bakeries, also spices shops (spezierie) were gradually
expanding. The notary Nascimbene Baietta in 1686 borrowed 450
ducats to “acquistare ogni cosa necessaria al figlio Giobatta che s’im-
piega nell’arte di speziale [e] per l’incaminamento del suo negozio
di speciaria medesima”45 (“to buy everything was necessary for his
son Gio.Batta who is going to open a spice shop”). The money was
lent at 6% interest rate by two creditors, Liberal Calvi and Giuseppe
Bernasconi, the latter was a moneychanger. The loan was a relatively
short-term credit lasting three years. For that sum the notary mor-
tgaged all his possessions in San Giorgio of Valpolicella, which in-
cluded farmland with vineyards, mulberry trees, countryhouse and
farmhouse. Furthermore, the debtor had to “[tenere] obbligate le
droghe e i medicamenti di speziaria” (“mortgaged all the products
and medicines that were in the shop”)46.
The range of debt causes was quite wide. Debtors borrowed
money to buy or repair a house, to purchase a plot of land, but also
for non-routine expenses. The twenty-year-old Gasparo Zanandreis
from Cavalo a small town in the Verona countryside was afflicted
by “morbo gallico” (syphilis) and borrowed 150 ducats for treatment
and medicines47. Toscana Leonardi and her son borrowed 200 ducats
“riparare la casa da tante spese” (“to cover the high costs of repairing
their house”)48. Very often a citizen went to the notary to have
prompt cash in order to meet “urgentissimi bisogni” (“extremely ur-
gent needs”). Notaries in this case turned out to be the privileged
route to swiftly collect capital.
Debtors included also numerous representatives of the local pa-
triciate, who needed capital for large investments. Agriculture was
the sector in which the urban elite mostly invested in the second half
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45 Asvr, Fondo notarile (notary Domenico Muttoni), busta 6992, prot. 253, 11 February
1686.
46 Ibidem.
47 Asvr, Fondo notarile (notary Francesco Bernardi), busta 1428, prot. 723, 14 September
1676.
48 Asvr, Fondo notarile (notary Francesco Bernardi), busta 1444, prot. 882, 8 October 1681.
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Capital flowed in the city and in the countryside. However, the
money was mainly collected inside the urban boundary. It mostly cir-
of the seventeenth century. The noble brothers Marc’Antonio and
Agostino Pindemonte, for instance – as many other families of the
Veronese oligarchy49 – borrowed 2,400 ducats (14,880 v.l.) from the
abbot Francesco Rinaldi in order to “procurar l’investitura d’acqua”
(“obtain the right of irrigation water from Venice”) necessary to “ir-
rigare i campi e far risaia” (“irrigate and create rice paddies”) in the
low lands of the veronese countryside. The Pindemontes had to re-
turn the money after five years, during which they would pay a 6%
interest rate50.
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49 As for instance the Serego, Sagramoso, Giusti, Pellegrini, Maffei, Campagna and Mi-
niscalchi, see P. Lanaro, Riso veronese e mercato veneziano. Primi appunti sulla produzione
e la commercializzazione del riso in terraferma veneta, Saggi di storia economica. Studi in
onore di Amelio Tagliaferri, Pacini editore, Pisa, 1999, p. 79-92.
50 Asvr, Fondo notarile (notary Donato Alessandri), busta 83, prot. 6, 26 March 1681.
FIGURE 4
The causes of debt1
1 Amount in ducats.
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In conclusion, in seventeenth-century Verona, as in many early-
modern European societies sharing “the same legal base and
codes”51, notaries played a decisive role in the private credit market.
They were not limited to passively drawing up contacts, but they
also selected and channelled the information they had gathered, thus
suitably matching the needs of debtors and creditors. A “priceless
market”, pivoted on these new professionals, was then created, in
which capital was not allocated on the basis of prices (i.e. interest
rates) but on information52. Only owners of real estate or fiscal rents
or immobilized capitals (like dowries) could operate in this market,
as the precondition for a loan was collateral, the range of individuals
that took part in the wide and deep credit networks was large. Not
only the patricians, the affluent bourgeoisie and large-scale mer-
chants, but also small landowners, artisans, women, especially wi-
dows, and generally those who were less familiar with formal
financial institutions attended this market. This study reveals that
only a small part of the capital was exchanged among “peers”, na-
mely among citizens belonging to the same social layer, profession
or village. Money, which was in some degree provided by religious
culated within it and was partly addressed to the countryside. A minor
provision of money came from outside the city walls (see Table 6).
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51 See J. Levy, Notaries and credit markets in nineteenth-century Mexico, pp. 459-478.
52 See P.T. Hoffman, G. Postel-Vinay, J.-L. Rosenthal, Priceless Markets, passim.
TABLE 6
Geographical distribution of money flows
Year City Countryside From cityto country
From outside
the city
1676 62.1% 10.2% 26.7% 1%
1681 82.6% 7.7% 8.7% 1%
1686 75.2% 10.3% 12.1% 2.4%
1691 68.8% 13.3% 16.4% 1.5%
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orders, and in the major by the urban elite, was addressed to finance
a vast spectrum of needs, counterbalancing the chronic lack of liqui-
dity that affected preindustrial societies. Capital was employed to
meet everyday expenses, taxes, and still extant debts, but also to fi-
nance infrastructure and large investments in agriculture and urban
business, like the starting up of a new shop or a new firm. Even
though this capital constituted in seventeenth-century Verona still a
minor share of all the money exchanges, it was the sign of an awa-
kening economy. New financial resources were injected into the cre-
dit market, attracted by the relatively high-profit and low-risk
lending activity, and especially by the role of notaries who did not
limit their role to drawing up contracts but were able to extend in-
formation and properly match demand for money and supply.
Archival References
1676
Archivio di Stato, Verona (hereafter Asvr), Fondo notarile, buste (fol-
ders): 16, 1532, 1188/89, 1317, 1192/93/94/95/96/97/98/99,
1320, 1321/22, 1334 – 1336, 1350, 1354, 1355, 1425/26/27/28,
1469/70/71, 1540, 1548, 1551, 1323/24, 3139, 3193, 3198/99, 3205,
3278/79, 4486, 4498/99, 4500, 4802, 5134, 5137, 5142, 5287, 5165,
5199, 5246/47/48, 5288, 5347, 5981/82, 6032, 6074/75, 6688, 7073,
6976/77, 7029, 7064, 7068, 7075, 8868, 9554, 9568, 9928, 9979,
9997, 10005, 10039, 10865/66, 10899/900/01, 11286/87, 11353,
11358, 11362, 11758, 11775, 11803, 11804, 11811.
1681
Asvr, Fondo notarile, buste: 16, 83/84, 1188/89, 1317, 1198/99, 1322,
1343, 1354, 1355, 1440/41/42/43/44/45, 1478, 5132, 1540/41,
1539,1542, 1543,1548/49/50, 1551/52, 3123, 3140, 3195, 3198,
3205, 3209, 3278/79, 4487, 4500/01, 4802/03, 5143, 5166, 5199,
5261/62, 5287, 5288/89, 5347, 5988/89, 6034, 6691/92, 6984/85,
7029, 7062, 7065, 7069, 7070, 7073, 7075/76/77 1083/84/85, 7097,
9554, 9568/69, 9940, 9957, 9980, 9985, 9987, 10038/39,
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10055/56/57/58/59/60, 10069, 10883/84, 10910/11/12/13/14/
15, 11316, 11295/96/97, 11353, 11759, 11769/70/71, 11803/04,
11810/11.
1686
Asvr, Fondo notarile, buste: 16, 52, 98, 136, 1188/89, 1317, 1323, 1331,
1339/40/41/42/43/44/45/46/47/48/49/50/51, busta 1354/55,
1458/59, 1483, 1533/34/35/36/27/38, 1548/49/50/51/52, 1458/59,
3123, 3193, 3205(06/07/08/09/10, 3278/79 – 3279, 4489, 4489,
4495, 4802/03, 5134, 5149, 5268/69, 5287, 5148, 5199, 5290/91,
5347, 6038, 5592, 6027, 6695, 7083/84/85, 7075/76/77, 7103,
7073,7117, 7031/32, 7068/69/70/71/72, 7100/01/02, 6992, 9568/69,
10060/61/62/63/64/65/66/67/68/69/70/71, 1055/54/55/56/
57/58,10072/73, 9990, 9995, 10074, 10038/39, 9998, 9941, 9981,
10883/84, 10925/26, 11062, 11353/54/55/56/57/58/59/60/61/62/
63/64/65/66, 11316, 11329, 11759/60, 11806, 11776, 11811, 11803.
1691
Asvr, Fondo notarile, buste, 59, 98, 137, 1188/89, 1324, 1332, 1344,
1354, 1489, 1324/25, 1548/49/50/51/52, 1690, 3193/94/95/96/
97/98/99/200, 3278/79, 3361, 3420, 4500/01/02, 4513, 4802/03,
5151/52, 5199, 5272, 5287, 5294, 5349, 5396, 6041/42, 6999, 7035,
7068/69/70/71/72/73/74/75, 7083/84/85/86, 7099/100/01/
02/03, 7117, 7132, 8935/36, 9568/69, 9983, 9986, 10040,
10055/56/57/58/59/60, 10078, 10892, 10883/84,10940/41,
11602, 11317, 11354, 11807, 11811.
Asvr, Collegio dei notai, Matricula notariorum, reg. 6 (1409-1611); Ma-
tricula notariorum, reg. 7 (1614-1800); Matricula notariorum, reg. 8
(1661-1800); Antico Archivio del Comune, reg. 771, Parte presa nel-
l’Eccellentissimo Consiglio di Pregadi in materia dell’ordine che si deve
tenere nelle Legittimationi, & nella creatione de Nodari, 21 gennaio
1612; reg. 772, Parte presa nell’Eccellentissimo Senato in materia della
Creatione de’ Nodari, Collegiati della Città di Bressa, 17 giugno 1614;
reg. 773, Capitoli spettanti al Governo de Sign. Nodari, approvati
dall’Eccellentissimo Senato con altri aggiunti dal Magnifico Consilio
di XII in virtù d’autorità ad esso conferita dallo stesso Eccell. Senato
sotto gli auspicii felicissimi dell’ Illustrissimo et Eccellentissimo Sig.
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Alvise Dolfin Podestà, essendo Provveditori di Commun li Magnifici
et Eccellentissimi Signori Antonio Portaluppi et Francesco Moscardo
Dottori di Legge Collegiati, 12 dicembre 1664; reg. 775, Clausularius
ad extensionem et explanationem abbreviationum & clausularum &c.;
reg. 776; reg. 777; reg. 780; reg. 781, Obblighi et incombenze de Mi-
nistri di Sanità raccolte e compilate d’ordine dell’Illustrissimi Signori
Com. Fr. Bartolameo Dal Pozzo, Conte Luigi Fracastor e March. Pietro
Maria Guarenti, Degnissimi Proveditori alla Sanità l’anno 1711; Pro-
cessi, busta 163, Copia di scrittura presentata agli Ill.mi et. Ecc.mi
Sig.ri Alvise Gritti, Benetto Giustinian et Pietro Emo in Roverchiara
li 2 novembre 1677 dalli Nobb. Sig.ri Co. Francesco Moscardo Dott.
Coll.o et Co. M’Antonio Verità C. a ciò deputati dalla Magnifica Città
di Verona; Antico Archivio del Comune, busta 41, Regole per le
reinvestiture, et affrancationi de’ capitali Ad Pias Causas della Città
di Verona.
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